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Abstract 
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring political Islamic movements such as the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood have gained significant influence in the Middle East. These developments have 
not remained unnoticed in the Western world especially in the case of the United States that 
has great interests in the region. This thesis examines the changed relationship between 
American foreign policy, the Middle East and political Islamic movements with a specific 
focus on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood during the Obama administration with respect to 
the Bush administration. The United States does not have a coherent and well-developed 
policy with regard to political Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood but its 
attitude towards these movements can be linked to foreign interests and the extent of 
Islamists' responses to the liberal and somewhat secular values of the United States.The 
American foreign policy towards the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has changed in some 
respect during the Obama administration with respect to the Bush administration. The Arab 
Spring has been an important change of context because consequently the Muslim 
Brotherhood was legalized and was able to play a significant role as a state actor. Obama 
made cautious steps to more formal engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood. In 
contrast, Bush kept the movement at arms length with behind-the-scenes engagements 
through third parties. Yet it is not so much the strategic interests and goals of the United 
States that have changed but rather the way they are pursued. 
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Introduction  
Half a century ago several academic writers argued that it would be a difficult argument to 
make that Islam could be influential upon political international affairs (Proctor, 1965; Cecil, 
1966). Even though in 1928 the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the first Islamic 
political movement that represented a traditionalist interpretation of political Islamic and 
international thought, it was argued that the idea of a connection between International 
Relations and Islam is distinctly wrong (Johnson, 2012; Cecil 1966). Nevertheless, political 
Islam is growing, diversifying and evolving. In fact, throughout the Muslim world Political 
Islam has become a dominating feature of politics. The question is if, and to what extent, this 
development also applies to international affairs.  
  
Although Islam is just one of the many religions to engage in political and social involvement 
as a response to contemporary global challenges and the desire to establish moral foundations, 
it has captured greater attention than any other religion. The emergence of transnational 
networks and political parties pursuing global agendas in the name of Islam has made 
Political Islam an integral part of global politics (Fuller, 2004; Johnson, 2012). The process of 
globalization has enabled a small radical minority within the Islamic political spectrum such 
as Al Qaida to gain the power to set the broader agenda in global politics as the “Global War 
on Terrorism” has demonstrated. However another group of less militant Islamic movements 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood have showed to play a more regional or domestic role. 
 
Recently the aftermath of the Arab Spring has also showed that in the Arab world itself 
political Islamic movements such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood have gained 
significant influence in society. The Muslim Brotherhood initially came out as the main 
beneficiary of the Arab Spring in Egypt even though at its beginning in 2011 the Arab Spring 
was not an Islamist uprising. It is evident that these developments have not remained 
unnoticed in the Western world. In the particular case of the United States the terrorists attack 
of 9/11 and its resulting “Global war on terror” and democracy promotion in the Middle East 
has greatly influenced its interest in and involvement with Islamic movements (Santing, 
2014).  
  
The relationship between the United States and the Muslim Brotherhood has fluctuated over 
the past fifteen years. The George W. Bush and Obama administrations have each in their 
own way related to and reacted on the Muslim Brotherhood which has led to policy 
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formulations towards the Middle East in general and towards Islamic movements more 
specifically. While the Muslim Brotherhood was dealt with infrequently and with great 
suspicion by the George W. Bush administration, the Obama administration has chosen a new 
path in which there has been more engagement in general with the Middle East starting with 
the outreach speech to the Muslim world in Egypt in 2009 (Al Dakhil, 2013).  
 
Research question  
There is a wide body of literature that addresses the issue of Political Islam, especially after 
9/11 when an increasing number of scholars concentrated on the relationship between Islam 
and the West. Within this context American foreign policy towards the Middle East has 
become a much debated topic, especially when it comes to transnational Islamic 
movements. Even before 9/11 Gerges (1999) wrote the first full-length account of this 
ideological American foreign policy debate. In his book America and Political Islam: clash of 
cultures or clash of interests he examines American foreign policy towards political Islamic 
movements in the Muslim world. Important in this debate is the made distinction between 
what he calls the “confrontationists” such as Bernard Lewis and Charles Krauthammer and 
the “accommodationists” such as Graham Fuller and John Esposito. Gerges shows how these 
two sides have influenced the foreign policy of the American government towards Islamism. 
Contrary to Gerges, Fuller (2004) in his book the future of political Islam gives a 
comprehensive definition of what he means with political Islam. With his definition he 
concentrates on the mainstream and attempts to prove that liberal political Islam supports 
democracy, tolerance and human rights, trying to counter the misperceptions that are 
prevailing in the West. Fuller explores the increasingly important role of Islam in politics in 
the 20th century which he argues is a response to both external and internal factors. In Global 
Political Islam Mandaville (2007) describes the complex interaction between Political Islam, 
globalization and nationalism and state and society. He argues that it is crucial 
to analyze Political Islam in regard to both international and national issues. He gives 
attention to transnational Islamic networks that are especially important in today’s globalized 
world.  
 
This thesis is an effort to contribute further to these debates on political Islam and focuses on 
political Islamic movements and US foreign policy with the specific case of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood. The importance of this research lies in the fact that in the current global 
context political Islam is not only a concern of the Middle East anymore but has become an 
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integral part of global politics. Moreover over the years the Muslim Brotherhood has played 
an increasingly important role in Egypt and despite its recent ban still holds a popular position 
in Egypt's society. Keeping in mind that Egypt is a strategic partner of the United States this 
has been a crucial development. The position of the United States towards the Muslim 
Brotherhood has changed during the George W. Bush and Obama administrations. In doing so 
the United States seems to have deviated from the “normal” diplomatic path of government-
to-government relations by increasingly engaging with non-state actors such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The question that will be addressed is what has changed the context and what 
are the reasons for these changes. What is the importance of the bilateral relationship between 
the United States and Egypt and what interest lies in the engagement with the Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
 
The thesis thus focuses on American foreign policy towards the Middle East and Egypt and 
more specifically towards the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood within a time period in which 
president George W. Bush and president Barack Obama were in office. A new era in US 
foreign politics that started with the attacks on 9/11 which marks an important point in the 
relationship between political Islam and the Western world and the United States in particular. 
This thesis examines the (changing) relationship between American foreign policy, the 
Middle East and political Islamic movements with a specific focus on the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood by addressing the following research question: “To what extent has American 
foreign policy towards the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood changed during the Obama 
administration with respect to the Bush administration?”  
 
Theories and method  
The method that is applied in this research is content analysis (Bryman, 2008). Data will be 
collected from public records and other documents that are relevant to this research such as 
academic writings, policy papers and strategic plans. Content analysis makes it possible to 
gather information from a range of areas and can provide valuable insights on the change of 
US foreign policy over time. 
 
To answer the research question, first the thesis looks at the foreign policy of the George W. 
Bush and Obama administrations towards the Middle East. It will be tested deductively 
whether the theories of International Relations can explain the position of the Bush and 
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Obama administrations towards the Middle East. Two theories of International Relations are 
applied in this research which are realism and liberalism. The realist theory is important as 
regards the balance of power and the security dilemma. Liberalism is also important because 
of the fact that states are not the only actors anymore in the global order that play a role. The 
global structure has been challenged by globalization with the result that non-sate actors such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood have gained a certain agency and are now competing with states 
in global politics.   
 
Second the position of the two administrations towards political Islamic movements in 
general will be discussed. Political Islam in this thesis is defined following the definition of 
Fuller (2004) that followers of Political Islam “believe that Islam as a body of faith has 
something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the 
contemporary (Muslim) world and seeks to implement this idea in some fashion.”   
 
Finally the thesis examines the position of George W. Bush and Obama towards the Muslim 
Brotherhood and how and why the policies towards the Muslim Brotherhood have changed. 
The Muslim Brotherhood is arguably one of the most prominent movements within the 
Islamic political spectrum and fits the definition of Fuller as it has the goal to instill the Quran 
and sunnah as the “sole reference point for (…) ordering the life of the Muslim family, 
individual, community (…) and state.” (Kull, 2011 p. 167). 
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1. Realism and Liberalism  
Since the Second World War American foreign policy has been defined by two grand 
strategies that are on the one hand realist in orientation and on the other hand liberal in 
orientation. It could be argued that the modern international order has been built by these two 
grand strategies (Ikenberry, 2002). The realist strategy is organized around deterrence, 
containment and the maintenance of the global balance of power which offers the best hope 
for stability and peace (Mearsheimer, 2013). During the Cold War this realist strategy was 
reflected in the nuclear deterrence and by managing the bipolar balance between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. However with the collapse of the Soviet Union balancing global 
power and containment ended and deterrence was no longer the defining logic of the existing 
order (Cram, 2015). On the other hand the strategy that is liberal in orientation is based on an 
opening of economies where democracy, open trade and multilateral institutional relations go 
together (Burchill, 2005). In this view the world order should be built around institutionalized 
political relations among integrated market democracies. It is a vision of world order that does 
not depend on an explicit policy of balance of power or an external threat (Ikenberry, 2002).  
 
Although the liberal strategy gained the upper hand throughout the 90s during the Clinton and 
first Bush administration, it seemed that from the Second World War until the George W. 
Bush administration the two grand strategies have remarkably worked well 
together (Ikenberry, 2002). On the one hand the liberal strategy created possibilities for 
American leadership. Moreover in a rule-based international order in which the United States 
could use political weight to derive congenial rules its interests were protected, its power was 
conserved and its influence was extended (Jones, Pascual & Stedman, 2010). On the other 
hand the realist strategy gave room for establishing different security commitments around the 
world by creating the right political rationale (Waltz, 2000). By the end of 1990 an 
international political order of democratic states was created. The global coalition was tied 
together through rule-based agreements and political-security partnership. This international 
order was based on the liberal bargain in which it was agreed upon that the European and East 
Asian countries would operate within an political-economic system in which American 
leadership was accepted. In return the Unites States would open itself up to its 
partners (Ikenberry, 2002). In other words the world agreed to live within the US system as 
the Unites States made its power safe for the world.  
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However since George W. Bush took office the two grand strategies of the United States 
foreign policy have became more and more competing. Bush on the one hand, convinced of a 
new external threat abetted by other states, choose to follow a more realist 
strategy. Optimistic that the United States had the capacity to reshape the world and restore 
the balance of power, under Bush, the United States went on the offensive (Ikenberry & 
Slaughter, 2006). Obama on the other hand seemed to have taken the route of a more liberal 
strategy. Obama rejected the unilateral role Bush had chosen for the United States (Qin, 2011). 
Bush had in its analysis failed to see that world politics were remade by the process of 
globalization and that the United States needed partners to protect its interests and achieve its 
goals. To win over those partners diplomatic engagement was needed, not 
intimidation (Ikenberry & Slaughter, 2006). Still, for all the differences between the Obama 
and Bush administrations, the common trait was shared that the world needed American 
leadership. It was  not merely a boast, it was a reality that reflected the United States' success 
as the global superpower over more than half a century (Lindsay, 2011). 
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2. Bush, Obama and the Middle East  
At the declaration of his candidacy in 1999 George W. Bush did not set out to remake 
US foreign policy. And even at the beginning of his presidency fighting terrorism did not 
figure prominently in his policy and his Realist officials did not make the global promotion of 
democracy a high priority as his predecessor president Clinton had done (Jentleson, 2010). 
However the relation between the George W. Bush administration and the Middle East turned 
out to be tensed. After just a couple of months in office the event of 9/11 ensured that a 
notable part of Bush' foreign policy was focused on the Middle East as in the first place the 
invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan showed. The attacks on the World Trade center in 2001 
changed the direction of US foreign policy as the terrorist attack was by president Bush 
seen as the manifestation of an existential threat similar to the threat posed in the past by 
the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany (Lindsay, 2011). The policy prescription that inexorably 
emanated from Bush's diagnosis of the external threat was a “war on terrorism”.  
 
It was not just a geopolitical clash, but a global struggle between good and evil and fighting 
terrorism became the highest priority of Bush's foreign policy towards the Middle East. One 
of the assumptions on which Bush's war on terrorism rested was the United States' ability to 
take the fight overseas because of its global dominance and more importantly because of its 
military dominance. The United States was not to react defensively by relying on passive 
measures to protect itself. As the security environment changed deterrence was in this case no 
longer an option, offense became the new strategy, which became to be known as the Bush 
Doctrine (Lindsay, 2011; Telhami, 2004). Although the United States' right 
to self defense was broadly supported, defining global terrorism beyond the immediate threat 
to the country and unilaterally acting upon this threat was not and thus became problematic.  
 
Thus after the event of 9/11 and subsequently the war on terror, new profound ideas on an US 
grand strategy arose. These new ideas were a first step of the unsettlement of the political 
order that had created a stable international system throughout the 90s. The new character of 
the contemporary threats of terrorists made it necessary for the United States to restructure the 
unipolar world and its unprecedented dominance. This was a serious challenge as the new 
threat was not another great power but a transnational terrorist network without a 
homeland (Hurrell, 2007; Lindsay, 2011). It resulted in a new paradigm on how the United 
States should organize world order and maintain power. In this new paradigm the United 
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States stepped forward to play a more unilateral role in dealing with terrorism and confronting 
rogue states seeking weapons of mass destruction (Ikenberry, 2002). 
 
As apparent from the invasion of both Afghanistan and Iraq the United States arrogated itself 
the global role of setting standards and using force to secure its own safety, and that of the 
rest of the world. Less bound or rather unconstrained by institutions and global rules of the 
international community. It used its unrivaled military power to manage its global power.  A 
new approach, defined as “new realism”, to restore or rather maintain the balance of power in 
which containment and deterrence were no longer the defining logics of the existing order as 
was the case during the cold war. As the interests of the great powers were more compatible 
The United States had considerable leeway to exercise American power (Ikenberry, 2002; 
Lindsay, 2011). Bush had however not anticipated that the Iraq war would actually 
demonstrate the limits of American power as it turned out to be a protracted and bloody 
occupation. 
 
When the rationales for the war in Iraq faded one of the main goals of the Bush administration 
became promoting democratic regime change in the Middle East (Bush, 2003). The Bush 
administration presented the United States as the benevolent hegemon that would use its 
power to promote democratic values and preserve peace. However democracy in the Middle 
East was necessary for the security of the United States and thus for their self-
interest. Balancing power in favor of freedom became the new objective and the United 
States' power should only be feared by those who oppose freedom (Jentleson, 2010). This 
attitude reflects the realist view that a dominant hegemon is needed for the international order 
to succeed.   
 
Promoting democracy in the Middle East was on the one hand an ongoing response to the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11. Democratization would bring greater political freedom 
and counter Islamic radicalism. On the other hand it was part of the particular need of the 
United States to justify the invasion of Iraq. More importantly there was the broader need 
to legitimize US foreign policy in the world and secure its own safety. The Bush 
administration has therewith in this period constantly reasserted the role of democracy as a 
core value of its foreign policy in the Middle East (Sharp, 2006). Furthermore as the invasion 
of Iraq did not bring the desired outcome and no weapons of mass destruction were found, it 
was more and more argued that the foreign policy was failing. Criticism on US foreign policy 
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increased both abroad and at home. In this light there was an increasing need to cast the fight 
against terrorism as an oversimplified struggle between good and evil that was fought on 
behalf of democratic civilization and to blame the policy failures on the enemies of 
democracy (Hurrell, 2007). By positioning democracy promotion as a leading goal of 
US foreign policy Bush slowly turned away from the original Bush Doctrine. This new goal 
diverted the attention from the weapons of mass destruction that were not found and forced 
opponents to agree as it was impossible for any critic to oppose the promotion of democracy. 
Freedom had always been an important theme for Bush but had never been a priority. Now it 
became a national security priority and besides an effective rhetorical device for blunting both 
international and domestic critics (Lindsay, 2011; Sharp, 2006).  
 
As the invasion of Iraq had failed with ongoing sectarian violence and partly as a result the 
instability across the Middle East grew, the Bush administration was faced with an ever-
widening gap between these failures of the policy and the rhetoric of promoting democracy in 
the Middle East. Acting consistently in support of democracy became much harder as it 
became politically harder to accept that democratization was inherently open-ended as the 
United States kept supporting democratically dubious states as core allies. Moreover the tone 
of the foreign policy towards major regional states was reshaped by counter-terrorism. 
Specific short-term foreign-policy goals of the United States were difficult to combine with 
the potentially valuable long-term objective of democracy (Hurrell, 2007). The in principle 
(semi) realist framework of Bush's policy sought to connect the main strategic goals of the 
United States to democracy, but at the same time for the sake of countervailing security and 
economic interests the intended goal of democracy promotion was sacrificed (Carothers, 
2007). The practicality of the democratization approach and the ability of the United States to 
accelerate forces of social change and modernization in such a diverse and wide area such as 
the Middle East became questionable. 
 
With the election of president Obama in 2009 it seemed that the administration was going to 
follow a different path with regard tot the foreign policy towards the Middle East. When the 
Obama administration came into office the Middle East continued to be a crucial 
region because of key foreign policy issues such as relations with Israel and Iran and also the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. With regard to political Islamic movements it might have even 
caught more attention as the aftermath of the Arab Spring has showed that political Islamic 
movements in the Middle East gained significant influence (Boukhars, 2011). A change in the 
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political environment could be a threat to American interests in the region. Although the 
Middle East policy of Obama has had some continuity with respect to Bush's policy there has 
also been crucial and distinctive changes. The Obama administration sought to diverge from 
the Middle East policies of the Bush administration, more than in any other region, although 
this did not mean a total break with the past (Jentleson, 2010). 
 
One of the main shifts in Obama's policy towards the Middle East was his tone as he 
addressed “the Muslim world”. In his inaugural address president Obama stated that the 
United States seeks “a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual 
respect”. (Obama, Inaugural Address, 2009). This tone differed from Bush's view who saw 
the Middle East as a place where terrorism consolidated. The central terrorist threat resided in 
“terrorist nations” and many US officials at that time talked as if defeating those states, such 
as Afghanistan, was defeating terrorism itself (Telhami, 2004). President Obama reinforced 
his message by saying that misunderstandings will be bridged and common ground will be 
sought. The United States conveyed its appreciation for Islam and it was emphasized that the 
United States was not, and never will be, at war with Islam (Obama, Remarks to Turkish 
Parliament, 2009). This new tone of president Obama especially came through in his speech 
in Cairo. As history showed that the relationship between the United States and the Muslim 
world had been defined more by differences than by what was or could be shared, Obama 
called for a new beginning. He stressed that there needs not to be competition as the United 
States and Islam are not exclusive (Obama, Cairo speech, 2009).  
 
A second major shift was engagement with adversaries instead of trying to isolate them. 
President Obama and his foreign policy team developed an engagement strategy as it was 
believed that engagement needed to play a larger role in the foreign policy of the United 
States. In the following years engagement has been a key part of Obama's foreign policy to 
strengthen and revitalize diplomacy of the United States with countries in the Middle 
East. The controversial war on terror and unpopular war in Iraq had constrained the United 
States' power as it had divided its allies and damaged its credibility and authority. With 
the engagement strategy Obama attempted to renew the United States' relationship with the 
world (Lord & Lynch, 2010).  
 
The Middle East was one of the principle focusses of the new strategy especially regarding 
countries like Syria, Iran and the Palestinian territories. Bush had withdrawn the ambassador 
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of the United States from Syria in efforts to isolate the country and reengaging it by 
precipitating regime change. Obama, by contrast, following the engagement strategy shifted 
from these efforts and sent an ambassador back to Damascus (Jentleson, 2010). With regard 
to the Palestinian territories Bush relegated the Arab-Israeli peace process to a lower priority 
whereas president Obama showed his commitment to a negotiated “two-state solution” when 
he appointed former Senator George Mitchell as lead diplomat for the conflict. Partly because 
the Gaza conflict between Hamas and Israel had again flared (Zanotti, 2010). 
 
The Bush administration endeavored to bring democracy to the Middle East during the war on 
terrorism, the Obama administration however realized the failure of this old foreign policy 
model in which democratically dubious states were tolerated as they were guarantors of US 
interests in the region. Ideas arose, especially after the Arab Spring, that it was time for the 
United States to redefine its role in the Middle East (Boukhars, 2011). By rejecting the core 
principles of Bush's worldview, Obama tapped into the American public’s disillusionment 
over the United States' foreign policy and more specifically over Iraq. According to president 
Obama, Bush did not recognize that globalization had changed politics and power relations. It 
had created new problems, such as terrorism, that transcended borders. The United States 
could not take on an unilateral role as in this new environment military power on which 
George W. Bush so heavily relied on before had limited utility (Lindsay, 2011) Bush was too 
quick to assume that having more power would bring more influence and naturally ensure 
desired outcomes. Although advantages in economic and military power do help they do not 
always suffice. Hard power that exacerbates tensions makes it harder to achieve influence that 
is essential for effective leadership.  
 
In this context president Obama chose for a new strategy which is described by the American 
political scientist Joseph Nye as smart power, where values and interests join. An approach 
that combines hard and soft power in which a strong military is underscored but there is also 
invested in diplomacy and alliances to expand American influence and its legitimacy for 
action. Obama's war in Libya is hailed by Nye as smart power in action (Nye, 2011). 
Obama, from a multilateralist approach, acknowledges economic and military advantages of 
the United States but also emphasizes the difficulties of converting power to influence. 
According to this new view, in international politics hard power remains a necessary tool, soft 
power in the form of persuasion can be more effective.  
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Egypt 
In the period 2001-2014 of the Bush and Obama administrations there have been both 
different and common trends in the relationship between the United States and Egypt. What 
has become evident over time is the strategic position that Egypt holds in the region, militarily, 
politically and economically, in the interests of the United States. The geographic location of 
Egypt, a land bridge between Asian and African countries on the air corridor route to the oil-
rich Persian Gulf region from west to east, makes it a vital partner for the United States. Also, 
Egypt controls the important Suez Canal waterway (Aftar dilian, 2011). Furthermore Egypt 
has close ties to the economies of the Middle East and Egypt and the United States have a 
significant economic partnership that dates back to the 80s. This partnership does not only 
yield dividends in terms of increased trade but also yields closer cooperation on initiatives in 
the region that are strategically important for the United States (Kotschwar & Schott, 2010). 
 
Egypt is home to long-standing centers of learning in the Middle East, new developments in 
the country often work as a bellwether for developments in other countries in the region. 
Moreover it often provides the site for diplomatic talks, particularly on the Israeli-Palestinian 
situation. The United States has provided Egypt with large sums of military and economic aid 
since the Camp David accord to secure Israel's security. In the view of breeding stability by 
economic development the United States considers it a long term investment toward peace in 
the Middle East. (Kotschwar & Schott, 2010). The continuing dominance of the military and 
an US benevolent president kept Egyptian politicians from exercising any significant 
influence over foreign issues that concern the United States (Aftar dilian, 2011). For decades 
the Egyptian government, led by the former president of Egypt Hosni Mubarak, was an 
important strategic partner for the national security interests of the United States in the Middle 
East (Sharp, 2006). 
 
After the attack on 9/11 US foreign policy political reform started to supersede economic 
reform not only in Egypt but also in other countries in the Middle East. Even though prior to 
the attacks the United States had long advocated the promotion of political freedom in Egypt 
the push for democracy has grown stronger during the government term of the Bush 
administration. As a mean to counter social and intellectual stagnation and more importantly 
as a counterweight to terrorism US policy makers attempted to balance US democracy 
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promotion with the economic and security interests of the United States by reinvigorated US 
policy towards Egypt (Sharp, 2006). 
 
However the potential dilemma that non-violent political Islamic parties or movements could 
oppose the key aspects of US foreign policy in the Middle East remained of great strategic 
importance when it comes to Egypt. In the light of this potential dilemma reality has showed 
that despite of three decades of assistance from the United States during the Bush 
administration Egypt remained a virtual dictatorship, ironically sponsored by the United 
States. Moreover it is not only the interests of the United States that play a role here. Because 
of Egypt's geographic location and importance in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the 
flow of money and military hardware between the United States and Egypt also include Israel 
and its interests. (Sullivan & Jones 2008).   
 
Until the involvement in Iraq Egypt has been receiving the largest amount of US foreign 
assistance in the Middle East. As Egypt has been at peace with Israel since 1979, the former 
president Mubarak has fashioned himself as a reliable negotiating partner in the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict and has there been a close cooperation between Egypt and the United States on 
intelligence and military issues (Sullivan & Jones 2008). Furthermore while Egypt like the 
United States and Israel had an interest in containing Hamas, Egypt's strategic importance for 
the United States has increased since Hamas came to power in 2006. This context has made 
the depth of the commitment of the United States to bring democracy to Egypt 
questionable. US policy makers toned down their rhetoric on reform in Egypt as containing 
the spread of Hamas' violent Islamist influence became a shared purpose for the United States, 
Israel and Egypt (Sharp, 2006). 
 
Given the critical position of Egypt for US interests it is not surprising that when in 2009 
president Barack Obama got elected as the new president of the United States he chose 
the capital of Egypt as the venue for his major outreach speech towards the Muslim world. 
Obama's speech seemed to hold a message of a different strategy towards the Middle East in 
contrast to the one upheld by former president Bush. Yet the old regime in Egypt, by many 
seen as a dictatorship, was still being supported by the newly elected Obama administration. 
This support was being confirmed by the reciprocal visits of vice president Joe Biden to 
Egypt and Mubarak to the White House. However, when two years later the unrest began in 
North Africa Obama stated that “societies held together by fear and repression are not 
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sustainable” and spoke of  “a historic opportunity” to change the status quo (Obama, 2011). 
What remained the same is that Obama believed that the United States has a stake in the self-
determination of individuals and the stability of nations. The United States welcomed the 
change in Egypt and tried to put itself forward as the country that valued “the dignity of the 
street vendor more than the raw power of the dictator.” (Obama, 2011).   
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3. United States' policy towards Islamic political movements  
The United States does not have a cogent and coherent or well-developed policy with regard 
to political Islamic movements that participate in the domestic political field of Muslim 
countries, such as the Muslim brotherhood. The position of the United States towards these 
movements has changed over time and is different from country to country depending on the 
mutual relationship between the United States and the country concerned but also political 
forces and the ruling administration (Vidino, 2013). Whereas Hamas for example, that won 
the 2006 elections in the Palestinian territories, has been listed as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has not though they have been labeled as a 
terrorist organization by Egypt since 2013 (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2015). Furthermore, 
among policymakers there is no consensus on the true nature of political Islamic. Specific 
bureaucratic cultures within the Bush and Obama administrations have intensified and 
reinforces different analytic perspectives on Islamic movements within the field of 
policymakers. 
 
The attitude of the United States towards political Islamic movements can also be linked 
to foreign interests and can be associated with the extent of Islamists' responses to the liberal 
and somewhat secular values of the United States. This has been shaped by geopolitical and 
historical considerations. The deep involvement of the United States in the Middle East is 
almost unique in its magnitude and has resulted in the development of different policies 
towards political Islamic movements (Al Dakhil, 2013). Yet the presidential terms of Bush 
and Obama have showed that these policies have not always been clear and certainly have not 
been permanent and coherent. One thing that has remained the same in US policies towards 
political Islamic movements is the ensurance of the national interest of the United States and 
in some specific cases of its core allies. 
 
This attitude towards political Islamic movements can be seen as a “clash of interests” rather 
than a clash of cultures. political Islamic movements are seen as an opposition to the strategic 
interests of the United States. Latent cultural hostility towards these movements only intrudes 
occasionally on the policymaking process, mainly via particular representatives in Congress 
(Gerges, 1999). Economic, political and psychological strategic factors play a larger role in 
the animosity between the United States and political Islamic movements. Yet apart 
from its national interests, the United States' antagonism towards political Islamic movements 
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can also be explained as a consequence of the policymaking process itself. In the case of the 
Muslim Brotherhood ignorance about Islamists and Islam, reliance on Muslim constituencies 
and barriers among government agencies in information sharing can also partly explain the 
different and incoherent responses to political Islamic movements (Vidino, 2010; Brooke, 
2013). A general lack of knowledge is thus one of the handicaps of US policymakers. 
 
The incoherent responses to political Islamic movements are most visible in the transition 
from the Bush administration to the Obama administration. The Bush administration dealt 
with these groups only in response to specific developments in the Middle East pursuing a 
rather reactive policy towards political Islamic movements. A limited relationship was 
allowed to keep Islamic movements at arm's length. On the contrary the Obama 
administration underwent a change of policy by beginning a cautious process of outreach 
which started with the speech in Cairo  (Brooke, 2013). Although the presidents have latitude 
for their strategic choices, policies are sometimes constrained by domestic politics and 
bureaucracies. Eventually it is the way that interests are pursued that often vary widely 
instead of the strategic character of interests themselves. When key national interests are 
perceived to be jeopardized presidential prerogatives are limited (Milner & Tingley, 2015). 
 
Although promoting democracy became one of the main goals of Bush's foreign policy it also 
put forward a vexing dilemma for US policy makers. If the United States would pressure 
governments in the Middle East to open their political systems it meant that political Islamic 
movements, that promote political and social reform in accordance with Islamic principles, 
would benefit from the regional democratization as they were and still are the most popular 
opposition force in the Middle East (Sharp, 2006). The election of Hamas in 2006 in Gaza 
posed a dilemma for the Bush administration as Hamas was listed on the terrorism list of the 
United States because it called for the destruction of one of the most important allies of the 
United States', Israel. Yet Hamas won the election and  Bush' policy became that of 
suspending financial aid to the Hamas government to pressure it to moderate (Jentleson, 
2010). The Bush administration believed that many political Islamic parties and movements 
generally oppose the key aspects of US foreign policy in the Middle East. Among other things 
the large military presence of the United States in the Middle East, the support of Israel and 
the occupation of Iraq could become highly opposed matters (Sharp, 2006).  Thus the 
adverse responses of political Islamic movements to US policy and values create a clash of 
interest which the United States wants to avoid.   
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It became more complex when the possibility of non-violent Islamic movements participating 
peacefully in the elections became a reality. This has especially been an issue for the Obama 
administration when in 2012 the Muslim Brotherhood won the election in Egypt. As promoter 
of democracy in the Middle East it would seem logical that the United States would include 
seeking more rights for all legitimate actors, also for these non-violent political Islamic parties. 
Bush's and Obama's support to the old regimes, until the Arab Spring, has showed the 
opposite with the excuse that promoting democracy in the Middle East is a complex 
issue whereas in reality US interests in the region were being secured.  
 
The Muslim Brotherhood  
The Muslim Brotherhood is by many Egyptians recognized for its charitable and educational 
work and has with this dedication gained much support among the middle class. It has 
enabled the Muslim Brotherhood to gain influence in many professional associations that 
represent academics, doctors, lawyers and engineers. The democratic credentials of the 
Muslim Brotherhood were doubted even though the organization in 2004 published a 
declaration in which it endorsed reform, accountability and elections and more importantly 
nonviolence. Although the Muslim Brotherhood itself remained illegal, independent members 
of the movements were gradually allowed to enter politics as independent candidates. In the 
2005 parliamentary elections Muslim Brotherhood members had moderate electoral success 
by winning almost 20% of the seats (Sharp, 2006).  
 
In the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution in 2011, when no longer illegal, the Muslim 
Brotherhood founded the Freedom and Justice Party with Mohamed Morsi appointed as 
president by the Muslim Brotherhood's legislative body. In previous elections the Muslim 
Brotherhood had ran its candidates to circumvent the ban on the movement that had been in 
place since 1954. The Freedom and Justice Party was after a lengthy process announced by 
the Egypt authorities to have almost won a majority of the votes. For the 2012 Egyptian 
presidential elections the Freedom and Justice Party initially fielded Khairat al Shater but 
after his disqualification by the election commission Mohamed Morsi was put forward as 
candidate. To reduce fears of an solely Islamist parliament the Muslim Brotherhood stated 
that in the upcoming elections it would be willing to cooperate with secular groups and 
stressed that it is not an theocratic party but a civil party. Mohamed Morsi became the 
first president of Egypt chosen by the people through free and fair elections (Vidino, 2013).  
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The same day of his electoral victory president Morsi received a call from president 
Obama who offered him his congratulations. President Obama said that the United States 
would support the Egyptian people in fulfilling the promise of their revolution and 
underscored the democratic nature of the transition. The shared interests between the United 
States and Egypt were emphasized and  president Morsi welcomed the support of the United 
States for the transition. Also mutual commitment to advance the relationship between the 
United States and Egypt was affirmed. Both presidents agreed on close contact in the 
upcoming weeks (Office of the Press Secretary, 2012).  
 
Morsi's victory, and that of the Muslim Brotherhood in general, was a historical reversal not 
only for Egypt but also for the United States that had forestalled to deal with Islamic 
movements as key state actors (Sharp, 2013). However after continuous unrest in the 
following months the Egyptian military began a crackdown against president Morsi and his 
supporters. In 2013 president Morsi was overthrown by the military led by Abdel Fattah el-
Sisi, chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces. Not only the Muslim Brotherhood was targeted but 
also violent Islamist as well as nonviolent secular organizations that opposed the new interim 
government. At the end of 2013 the interim government of Sisi designated the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a terrorist organization because of attacks by followers of the MB subsequent 
to the removal of President Morsi. These accusations however lacked any significant evidence 
that the Muslim Brotherhood was actually involved in the attacks (Bureau of 
Counterterrorism, 2013).  
 
After President Sisi's victory he also received a call from President Obama who congratulated 
him on his inauguration. The call followed the same protocol as with former President Morsi. 
Obama conveyed his commitment to cooperating with Sisi, emphasized the shared interest of 
the United States and Egypt and the United States' continuing support for the social, economic 
and political aspirations of the Egyptian people following the revolution. Finally Obama 
and Sisi affirmed their mutual commitment to the strategic partnership between Egypt and the 
United States (Office of the Press Secretary, 2014). The Obama administration thus welcomed 
whatever government came to power but constantly emphasized and reaffirmed the mutual 
interests of the two countries to ensure that Egypt remains a strategic partner.  
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The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the United States during the last two 
presidential administrations can be described as one with fluctuations. The Bush 
administration dealt with the Muslim Brotherhood with great suspicion whereas the Obama 
administration followed a path of engagement and had established contacts by the in 2011 
established political party of the Muslim Brotherhood the Freedom and Justice Party 
(Al Dakhil, 2013).  
 
The Egyptian government either suppressed, supported or tolerated the organization. Either 
way, apart from the revolution year in 2011 and the following year, the 
Muslim Brotherhood has had the precarious status of an illegal organization in Egypt. 
Furthermore the issue of pursuing engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood has prompted 
differences among Western observers. Although over the past decades the Muslim 
Brotherhood had committed itself to non-violent opposition, its history and 
sometimes fundamental  ideologues have cast a shadow on their motives. Moreover the fact 
the Egyptian government had been steadfast in its resistance to the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the opposition to any Western dealings with the Muslim Brotherhood, complicates the 
pursuit of engagement with the group (Sharp, 2006). In 2013, after the overthrow of 
president Morsi, the interim government backed by the Egyptian military even declared the 
Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group, prohibiting all the organizations activities and also 
membership and financing of the group.  
 
Bush had officially rejected political Islamic movements, partly because of the attacks on 
9/11. Overt contacts between Islamic movements and the government of the United States were 
removed even tough a host of political Islamic movements condemned the attack, among them the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Still, for the United States all Islamists became suspicious. The confusion was 
even greater when US policymakers kept sending mixed signals about the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Brooke, 2013). After the Bush administration began to promote it's agenda of bringing democracy to 
the Middle East it's policy of refusing contact with the Muslim Brotherhood persisted. Even when 
Bush's democracy promotion reached it heights and Secretary Condoleezza Rice visited the American 
University of Cairo in 2005 to speak about the need for democratic reform in the Middle East and 
Egypt specifically, the Bush administration did not concede to official contact with the Muslim 
brotherhood. The Secretary affirmed that the United States did not engage with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and would not do so in the future, supporting her statement by citing that the Muslim 
brotherhood is formally illegal in Egypt and the United States has to respect it's rule of law (Brooke, 
2013).  
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Still, there has been an ongoing debate within the foreign policy establishment of the Bush 
administration whether the Unites States should engage with political Islamic movements or 
parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood that have renounced the use of violence and try to 
proclaim their Islamic ideals for society through mainstream politics. It was and still is a 
highly charged and vigorous issue as the earlier mentioned “dilemma of democracy” has 
showed, because even non-violent political Islamic movements that chose to participate in 
politics and have done so present their own challenges to the policy makers of the Unites 
States. (Sharp, 2006)  
  
Despite the United States call for “political reform” in Egypt the Egyptian government itself 
has been wary to empower the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim 
Brotherhood had  pursued political power peacefully for decades but was still seen as a 
movement that opposed Egypt's close ties to the United States. It was feared that when the 
Muslim Brotherhood would come to power it would significantly change Egypt's foreign 
policy. Considering the Muslim Brotherhood's views this could effect the relationship with 
the United States and it's interests in the Middle East. (Sharp, 2006). The short period of time 
that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was in power could not show whether these fears were 
justified.  
 
In this context the Bush administration had eagerly respected Egypt's wish to not allow 
(illegal) political Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to officially 
participate in the reform activities that were sponsored by the United States. It was to be 
ensured by non-governmental democratic organizations that US funded training programs 
and seminars were not attended by participants from the Muslim Brotherhood. Neither was 
the Muslim Brotherhood allowed to have extensive contacts with US diplomats in Cairo. 
However as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is the most organized and effective opposition 
group in Egypt it was for the Bush administration a movement that should remained 
monitored one way or another (Sharp, 2006). Hence the United States did 
not out rightly reject any contact with Muslim Brotherhood members in Egypt. Since the 
Muslim Brotherhood was banned under Egyptian law the United States would according to 
the US State Department not deal directly with its members. Contacts between members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood and US third parties such as think tanks and foundations were not 
uncommon (Vidino, 2013).  
 
24 
 
The relationship between the United States and the Muslim Brotherhood was thus 
somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand the Bush administration was eager to follow the 
Egyptian government in its policy to ban the Muslim Brotherhood from participating in the 
political field. Preventing the Muslim Brotherhood from gaining power was essential to avoid 
a clash of interests such as the support for Israel. However such a strong opposition that could 
become a threat in a country of great importance for the US and its core allies should be kept 
at arm's length. Thus the United States maintained various, mainly behind-the-scenes, 
engagements with members from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood not so much because of 
the democratic principles they promoted but more for it own interests (Vidino, 2013).  
 
Prior to 2011 closer relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood were hindered by efforts of 
counterterrorism and the importance of handling security matters. Although there had been 
contact between officials of the United States and Muslim Brotherhood members, the Arab 
Spring led to more explicit calls from the United States for engagement and dialogue 
(Al Dakhil, 2013). Moreover as the Muslim Brotherhood gained more power after the Arab 
Spring engagement with them became more crucial for the United States. Subsequent to the 
events of the Arab Spring the awareness within the Obama administration grew that the 
political Islamic movements were in the immediate future going to play a more important role 
in the shaping of the Middle East. This has brought US policymakers to change their policies 
towards Islamic movements in some way. The Obama administration made significant but 
still cautious steps to renew contacts with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood by engaging and 
establishing formal contacts with the political party of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Freedom 
and Justice Party (Vidino, 2013; Brooke, 2013). This differs from the Bush 
administration that was reticent and maintained only informal and behind-the-scenes 
engagements with individual members of the Muslim Brotherhood mainly through third 
parties.  
 
At the beginning of the protests in 2011 against former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak the 
Obama administration still lent it's diplomatic support to the old regime. When the protests 
grew and Mubarak's regime began to collapse the Obama administration attempted to 
demobilize the protesters by advocating an orderly transition. This transition was designed to 
preserve the heart of the old regime, that the US had supported despite being a democratically 
dubious regime, via a handoff to intelligence chief and Vice President Omar Suleiman. 
However the protesters on Tahrir square did not give in to this plan and the Supreme Council 
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of the Armed Forces (SCAF) stepped in and guided the transition (Brownlee, 2012). Again 
the United States sought to secure its longstanding security relationship with Egypt through 
the SCAF.  
 
Although official White House statements did not explicitly refer to the Muslim Brotherhood, 
US officials did not rule out dealing with the movement privately to accommodate events on 
the ground. As the SCAF took over the transition and guided the process by setting the 
timeline for elections, the United States kept monitoring at the background. Interaction with 
the Muslim brotherhood took place through NGO initiatives that were aimed at political 
education and party building and sometimes included members from the Muslim 
Brotherhood's party the Freedom and Justice Party (Blackledge & Butler, 2012). Moreover as 
part of a diplomatic strategy to keep the lines of communication with the Muslim brotherhood 
open US diplomats were allowed to deal with members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had 
won seats in the parliament as independents.  
 
Because of the growing political weight of the Muslim Brotherhood the Obama 
administration eventually decided to resume formal contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
This to the displeasure of critics in the US Congress and Israel that believe that the Muslim 
brotherhood should not be dealt with in any way because of their alleged hostile position 
towards US values. The first on the record statement on the Muslim Brotherhood was made 
by Secretary Hillary Clinton during a meeting with the Hungarian Prime Minister Arshad 
Mohammed. When a journalist from Reuters inquired Clinton on the United States' policy 
towards engagement with the Egyptian Muslim brotherhood she responded that the Obama 
administration is continuing the approach that existed off and on in the past years, which is 
that of limited contact. Clinton did add that it is in the interest of the United States to engage 
with all parties that are intending to compete for the parliament and the presidency and are 
committed to peace (US Department of State, 2011).  
 
The Muslim Brotherhood's commitment to nonviolence, the changed political landscape as a 
consequence of the Arab Spring and the foundation of the Freedom and Justice Party has 
made the Muslim Brotherhood a movement that could not be ignored. Dialogue with Muslim 
Brotherhood members was therefore welcomed. Furthermore Clinton stated that in any 
contact with the Muslim Brotherhood the United States would keep emphasizing the 
importance of democratic principles (US Department of State, 2011).  
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Despite the different statements on establishing official contacts with the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, high-level contacts with the movement were established only after the 
parliamentary elections. When it became clear that  the Freedom and Justice party of the 
Muslim Brotherhood won a significant contingent in parliament senior US officials began to 
formally seek out to members of the Muslim Brotherhood. At the end of 2011 and beginning 
of 2012 (senior) officials from the Egyptian Muslim brotherhood and Freedom and Justice 
Party met with John Kerry, Chairman of the Senate Committee Foreign Relations, Jeffrey 
D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary of State and Willam Burns, Deputy Secretary of State 
(Brooke, 2013). In April 2012 a delegation from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom 
and Justice Party visited the United States and met with US officials in the Sate Department 
and White House. As the Freedom and Justice Party was the new governing party of Egypt, 
an American ally, the visits of the delegation were procedurally speaking a matter of course. 
Press Secretary Jay Carney emphasized that Egypt's political landscape had changed and that 
the United States has broadened its engagement to include new and emerging actors and 
political parties. He stated that the United States will not judge these actors by their religious 
affiliation but by how they act (Office of the Press Secretary, 2012).  
 
The visits ignited controversy among critics especially as the visits coincided with the Muslim 
Brotherhoods decision to field Mohamed Morsi as president even though they had earlier 
pledge not to put forward a candidate for the presidency. However, in the beginning US 
policy makers did not seem to have genuine concerns with the developments in Egypt. They 
were rather comfortable or perhaps relived as the initial candidate Khairat al Shater had 
already met with multiple delegations from Washington and was known to foreign diplomats 
and the SCAF. Supporting al Shater as candidate was part of a strategy to forestall gains of 
the Salafist candidate Hazem Abu Ismail, seen as more unpredictable and fundamental and a 
greater threat to US interests in Egypt. The Brotherhood who was once feared to take over 
now was a tolerable and indispensable ally against Egypts more conservative Islamists 
(Brooke, 2013).  
 
The official meetings were an important shift as the Obama administration tried to deal with a 
scenario, cooperating with an Islamic political movement such as the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which prior administrations sought to avoid and forestall (Sharp, 2013). Although the United 
States' attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood during the Obama administration is 
somewhat different than during the Bush administration, Bush did not have to deal with the 
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growing significance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian political field as Obama as 
they were legalized due to the consequences of the Arab Spring. Though the Obama 
administration supported the democratization in the region it did not take any significant 
measures when the democratically elected president Mohammed Morsi of the Freedom and 
Justice Party was overthrown by the military in 2013, other than condemning it. 
 
Rather officials from the Obama administration suggested that Morsi brought it on himself. 
Deputy Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken stated that the attitude President Morsi had of, 
“governing as if he had 100 percent” (US Department of State, 2015), was not the path to 
long-term stability in Egypt. Blinken also added that the United States had no affinity for the 
Muslim Brotherhood or its policies but only engaged with Morsi and tried to work with him 
because he was the elected President (US Department of State, 2015) .   
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4. Conclusion  
Two grand strategies have defined the foreign policy of the United States since the Second 
World War namely, liberalism and realism. Since George W. Bush took office the two 
strategies became more competing with regard to the policy towards the Middle 
East. Whereas the Bush administration followed a more realist strategy convinced of a new 
external threat, the Obama administration took the route of a more liberal strategy. Bush took 
a unilateral role to reshape the world and restore the balance of power. President Obama 
however acknowledged the importance of their partners to protect its interests and achieve its 
goals as world politics were remade by the process of globalization.     
  
During the government term of the Bush administration the relation with the Middle East was 
tensed especially as a consequence of the attacks of 9/11. As the invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan showed the Middle East became an important focus of the foreign policy of the 
United States. The changing security environment pushed the United States to take a new 
strategy of offense, the Bush Doctrine. The Bush administration used its unrivaled military 
power and took a unilateral role in dealing with terrorism unconstrained by the institutions 
and global rules of the international community. When the rationales for the war in Iraq faded 
balancing power in favor of freedom became the new objective. To legitimize its foreign 
policy towards the Middle East Bush's new main goal became the promotion of democratic 
regime change in the Middle East. However for the sake of strategic goals and interests and 
countervailing security the intended goal of democracy promotion was sacrificed as the Bush 
administration kept supporting democratically dubious states.  
 
With the election of President Obama the foreign policy towards the Middle East started to 
take a different path. The Obama administration sought to separate from the Middle East 
policies of the Bush administration and establish its distinctiveness. One of the main shifts is 
that Obama addressed “the Muslim world” and stressed that there needs not to be competition 
as the United States and Islam are not exclusive. Furthermore the Obama administration 
developed an engagement strategy to strengthen and revitalize diplomacy of the United 
States. From a multilateral approach Obama acknowledged economic and military advantages 
but emphasized that the US should also invest in diplomacy and alliances to expand American 
influence and its legitimacy for action.   
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Egypt holds a critical position in the strategic and military interests of the United States 
mainly because of its strategic geographic location. Although Egypt is an important ally of the 
United States and received much financial support, after the attack on 9/11 political reform 
started to supersede economic reform and the push for democracy grew stronger. As a 
counterweight to terrorism policymakers from the United States attempted to find a balance 
between the United States' security and economic interests and the promotion of democracy. 
However this policy posed a dilemma for the United Sates as the push for political reform 
opened the way for non-violent Islamic movements to enter the field with the fear that they 
would oppose US values and key aspects of US foreign policy in the Middle East. As a 
consequence Egypt has, until the Arab Spring, remained a virtual dictatorship under the rule 
of Mubarak. This context made the United States' commitment to democracy promotion in 
Egypt questionable.  
 
With regard to political Islamic movements that participate in the political field, such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the United States does not have a coherent and well-developed 
policy. The United Sates attitude towards these movements can be linked to its foreign 
interests and the extent of Islamists' responses to the liberal and somewhat secular values of 
the United States. It also depends on the administration in office which has been most visible 
in the transition from the Bush administration to the Obama administration. Whereas Bush 
pursued a reactive policy towards Islamic movements dealing with these groups only in 
response of specific developments, President Obama follows a cautious process of outreach 
that began with the speech in Cairo. Yet it is not the strategic character of interest that varies 
but rather the way these interest are pursued.   
  
After the attacks on 9/11 the Bush administration officially rejected Islamic movements, even 
though a host of Islamic movements had condemned the attack, and overt contacts between 
political Islamic movements and the US government were removed. Much confusion 
remained as US policymakers kept sending mixed signals and the debate on dealing with non-
violent political Islamic movements went on.  
 
Dealing with Islamic movements became more complex because of the “dilemma of 
democracy”. Political Islamic movements competed in elections and actually won such as 
Hamas in 2006 and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in 2011. Especially the victory of the 
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Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi in Egypt was problematic as Egypt's political 
actions are of interest for the United States and its core ally in the Middle East. These 
developments have posed new challenges to US policy makers. Despite the policy of 
democracy promotion both Bush and Obama kept supporting the old regime in Egypt, until 
the Arab Spring.   
  
The attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood has therefore fluctuated over the past thirteen 
years. The Bush administration dealt with the Muslim Brotherhood with great suspicion but 
kept the group at arms length. Considering the Muslim brotherhood's views it was feared that 
if the movement would come to power it would significantly change Egypt's foreign policy 
and effect the United States' interests in the region. The Bush administration thus eagerly 
respected Egypt's wish to not allow the Muslim Brotherhood to officially participate in the US 
sponsored reform activities. Yet as the Muslim Brotherhood is the most organized and 
effective opposition group in Egypt Bush deviated from the “normal”diplomatic path of 
government-to-government relations and kept the group monitored. The United States 
maintained informal contacts through third parties and NGO's, not so much because of the 
democratic principles they promoted but to secure its interests.  
 
At the beginning of the Arab Spring the Obama Administration still lent its diplomatic 
support to the old regime of Mubarak despite it being a democratically dubious regime. When 
the old regime started to collapse the Obama administration advocated an orderly transition 
designed to preserve the heart of the old regime. Eventually when it became clear that the 
Muslim brotherhood was gaining political weights the Obama administration made significant 
but still cautious steps to renew contacts with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood by engaging 
and establishing formal contacts with the political party of the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
Freedom and Justice Party. After the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in the parliamentary 
elections high-level contacts were established between the United States and the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  
 
Prior administrations sought to avoid and forestall cooperating with the Muslim Brotherhood 
but for the Obama administration it became a factual scenario. Taking the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a tolerable and indispensable allay against Egypts more conservative Islamists 
became an important shift in the policy towards Islamic movements. However when the 
democratically elected President Morsi was overthrown by the military in 2013 the 
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Obama administration  did not take any significant measures. Rather US officials stated that 
the United States had no affinity for the Muslim Brotherhood or its policies and they only 
engaged with Morsi  because he was the elected president.  
 
Thus American foreign policy towards the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has 
changed in some respect during the Obama administration with respect to the Bush 
administration. The Arab Spring has been an important change of context because 
consequently the Muslim Brotherhood was legalized and was able to play a significant role as 
a state actor which the United States had to deal with. The liberal strategy of Obama in 
contrast to the realist strategy of Bush has also played a role in the changed 
relationship as Obama made cautious steps to more formal engagement with the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a state actor. In contrast, Bush kept the movement at arms length with behind-
the-scenes engagements through third parties. Yet the dilemma of democracy remained and 
the Obama administration also kept supporting the old regime until the revolution to protect 
its interest in Egypt. In other words it is not so much the strategic interests and goals of the 
United States that have changed but rather the way they are pursued. Finally when key 
national interests are perceived to be jeopardized even presidential prerogatives are limited.   
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